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Abstract
This paper describes nancial systemic risk as a pollution issue. Free riding leads to
excess risk production. This problem may be solved, at least partially, either by nancial
regulation or by taxation. From a normative viewpoint, taxation is superior in many re-
spects. However, reality shows that nancial regulation is adopted more frequently. This
paper makes a positive, politico-economic argument. If the majority chooses regulation, the
level is likely to be too harsh. If it chooses taxation, then the level is likely to be too low.
Due to regressive e¤ects, a tax on nancial transactions receives low support from a majority
of low polluting portfolio owners. The same kind of majority may strategically choose regu-
lation in order to burden the minority with a larger share of the cost of reducing systemic risk.
JEL Classication: O23; O43; O51
Keywords: nancial crisis; systemic risk; banking regulation; nancial transaction taxes;
political economy
1. Introduction
The dilemma between regulation and taxation of nancial activities has come under closer
scrutiny as a result of the recent crisis. Both regulation and taxation are policy instruments
that curb systemic risk, a peculiar externality resulting from contagion e¤ects.
In a perfect Pigouvian world, taxation and regulation would be equivalent: both poli-
cies can achieve a rst-best outcome if well calibrated to deal with the above-mentioned
externality. But in the real world, nancial regulation is largely preferred.
Over the last decade, several G20 countries have imposed di¤erent forms of nancial
transaction tax, but the general trend has been a reduction of their application (Matheson,
2011). More recent experiences conrm this trend. In the US, the 2010 Dodd Frank Act
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has focused on capital adequacy requirements instead of taxation. In the European Union,
the e¤orts to introduce a nancial tax have been frustrated so far by the impossibility to
achieve consensus amongst all 27 member states, while they have been able to dene common
guidelines on banking regulation to face systemic risks. How is that regulation is so frequent
in nancial markets, while taxation is rarely employed to cope with systemic risk problems?
An intuitive explanation is based on a normative argument. Financial regulation has
progressive e¤ects on investors risk taking, while at taxation rates yield a proportional
impact on risk. Thus policymakers choose the former in order to curb risk where it mostly
arises. The presence of a bias in risk measurement strengthens this argument. Regulation
has a more precise e¤ect on the curbing of the systemic risk, thus it is less a¤ected by the
bias. In a world dominated by uncertainty and asymmetric information the bias can be a
severe constraint.
Here we propose an alternative view, which adopts a positive approach based on political
economics as rst proposed by Alesina and Passarelli (2010) for a general pollution problem.
Realistically regulation has a stronger impact on high-risk polluting portfolios, while taxation
a¤ects also low-risk polluting portfolios. The majority of low-polluting portfolio owners may
have a strategic incentive to choose regulation in order to o­ oad to the minority a larger
share of the externality reduction burden. This may lead to a double political distortion:
rst, a suboptimal choice of the policy instrument; second, a suboptimal level of the policy.
The position of the median risk producer plays a crucial role in the political game.
Taxes and rules are di¤erent in the way they allocate the sacrices of an externality reduction.
In the case of regulation, most of the sacrices are made by top-risk producers. We show
that even a median risk producer that is slightly above the average leads to a regulation level
that is too restrictive. By contrast, with a tax low-risk producers bear a consistent amount
of the costs. Thus a low median agent is induced to prefer taxes that are too low. As in the
political analysis of income taxation (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), the distortion depends on
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the position of the median voter relative to the average.1
Our model predicts that a democratic society mostly populated by small, low-risk port-
folio owners is more likely to choose regulation instead of taxation. This argument explains
why regulation is so frequent in nancial markets, whereas taxation is adopted much less.
Such society is likely to choose a level of the regulation that is too high. This might explains
why there is a widespread perception that current regulation policies in nancial markets
are ine¢ cient and possibly too harsh.
A fundamental assumption is that, independently of the toxicity measure adopted, regu-
lation has a more than proportional impact on more toxic instruments; i.e. it forces people
to progressively abate risk in their portfolios. For example, a sharp prohibition rule (such as,
"all instruments whose toxicity level is above a given threshold are banned") has a dramatic
progressive impact and it works like an extremely convex tax function (such as: "innite-tax
rate above the threshold and zero-tax rate below"). By its nature, taxation tends to be less
progressive, if not regressive.
The assumption that regulation is more progressive than taxation can be justied if one
considers that usually lending institutions meet regulation on risk by drastically cutting on
their most toxic assets. Vice versa, with a tax they may decide to keep some of those assets
if they make high prots from them, and just pay the tax.
Moreover, the fact that regulation is more progressive may result from a measurement
problem. In principle, the base of either taxation or regulation should be a non-distorted tox-
icity measure. However, measuring toxicity may be quite costly, if not virtually impossible.
Rules and taxes are then applied to di¤erent measures of toxicity which are also di¤erently
distorted. In general, rules a¤ect the supply of toxic instruments directly, and this may cause
progressive e¤ects. Taxes are usually levied on indirect and less than proportional measures
1Observe that Meltzer and Richard (1981), and all the subsequent literature, only consider the political
distortion on the level of a given instrument. Alesina and Passarelli (2010) and the present paper are probably
the rst works which study the political distortion on the choice of the instrument too. For an extensive
survey of the related political economy literature, see Persson and Tabellini (2002).
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of toxicity, such as nancial transactions or banksturnover. This causes a regressive e¤ect.
We explore the relationship between measurement bias and political distortion. We claim
that when the ability to tax systemic risk is su¢ ciently high (i.e. measurement bias is low),
there is no regressive e¤ect. In this case a small-portfolio median voter has the incentive
to choose a high tax rate. Vice versa, if measurement bias is strong, a tax has a regressive
e¤ect. Thus even a small-portfolio median owner prefers a tax rate that is too low. This
might explain why in the current debate on nancial transaction everybody expects that, in
case a transaction tax will be implemented, the tax rate will realistically be very low.
This paper is related to a large body of theoretical literature which has recently studied
policy tools to reduce nancial systemic risk. Major attention has been devoted to banks
liquidity management, which seems to have been a factor of contagion. In fact, the crisis of
the wholesale credit market has determined the rapid withdrawing of short-term debt, with
the consequent shock propagation across the system (Brunnermeier, 2009; Allen et al., 2010;
Gorton, 2010).
In Perotti and Suarez (2011) the externality problem specically resides in the wedge
between the private and social value of banks short-term funding. Based on a price vs
quantity argument (Weitzman, 1974), the authors claim that, when the main source of
bank heterogeneity is credit ability, a at rate tax on short-term funding is e¢ cient because
it allows good banks to continue lending. When heterogeneity concerns solvency or risk-
taking, quantity instruments, such as net funding or capital ratios, are preferable. Acharya
and Öncü (2010) are in favor of a repo authority which takes over repo positions during
systemic events. Gorton (2010) proposes to stop discounted price sales of large collaterals
by a state blanket guarantee. Farhi and Tirole (2012) look at bail-out expectations, which
imply an endogenous loss of public control over money supply. This calls for measures to
reduce the private creation of liquidity risk.
Most of this literature adopts a normative viewpoint, in which the basic question is:
"What is the best thing to do?". To the best of our knowledge, no existing work has
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addressed positive, political economy issues. This paper is novel in this respect. We try to
answer a di¤erent question: "What is the most likely thing to happen?".
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the current debate
on SRE taxation. Section 3 presents a general model where agents/voters are heterogeneous
in the amount of systemic risk that they produce. Section 4 studies the e¤ects of regulation
and how people vote on it. Section 5 does the same for a tax. Section 6 addresses the issue
of instrument choice. Section 7 contains our conclusions.
2. The current debate
The main kind of externality that justies government intervention in the nancial in-
dustry as a whole is systemic risk contagion (a macro prudential externality; Claessens et al.,
2010; Goodhart, 2011; Hanson et al., 2011). The denition of any nancial portfolio is based
on leverage contracts, characterized by the fact that the potential e¤ects are not completed
internalized within the contractual relation itself. The default of a specic nancial portfolio
can originate negative and self-amplifying e¤ects on the claims of other interconnected oper-
ators, producing a domino e¤ect. Therefore each nancial portfolio can be characterized by
a given level of toxicity in terms of systemic risk externality (SRE). At the same time, any
nancial rm can also be considered as a more or less complex nancial portfolio, and its
overall attributes institutions, size, interconnections, substitutability can contribute to
systemic risk (Claessens et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2012b). In other words, some nancial
institutions contribute more than others to produce nancial system risk (Acharya et al.,
2009).
To cope with the nancial externality, governments can use two broadly dened policies:
taxation or regulation. An SRE tax is aimed at reducing the gap between social and private
cost of systemic risk. The latter becomes more costly, thus agents reduce the risk content
of their private portfolios. Alternatively the government can directly limit the possibility to
build high SRE portfolios, by issuing and enforcing ad hoc SRE regulation.
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In principle, taxation is superior to regulation. A nice non-linear SRE tax scheme can
be designed to yield any desired progressive impact. The marginal tax rates can be set so
that they reect the agentsmarginal costs of reducing risk. Moreover, a tax solves the
Mirrlees problem, when the government cannot detect those costs. A tax works best in an
environment where information about agentspreferences is costly or impossible to gather
(Claessens et al., 2010; Jeanne and Korinek, 2010). Keynes (1936) is the most famous
proponent of an SRE tax, although he identied securities as the sole source of instability.
He has been followed by many others (among them, Stiglitz, 1989).
An SRE tax is more e¢ cient than a generic nancial tax. As it has been clearly high-
lighted by Goodhart (2011), a SRE tax can be calibrated to reduce the expected welfare
costs produced by the nancial activity. The consequent deterrence e¤ect can be produced
gradually by an appropriate tax schedule. Furthermore an SRE tax is a forward looking.
It can a¤ect the future behavior of the nancial market participants, while generic nancial
taxes on ex post basis are backward looking. They are levied on the survived nancial rms,
punishing the good bankers, not the bad ones.
Despite many authors have recently claimed that SRE taxation represents an e¤ective
tool to prevent systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2009; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Acharya
et al., 2012a), both academic and policy debates have paid relatively little attention to the
possible use of this kind of tax. In the real world, regulation is the main instrument to curb
nancial externalities, while corrective taxation seems to have a minor complementing role,
if any.
The recent policy debate within the European Union is illuminating. The 2007-2009 crisis
caused damaging turmoil in the banking and nancial markets. Several European govern-
ments adopted a variety of regulatory measures to prevent future production of systemic risk,
such as bank recapitalization and nancial guarantee programs. Additional measures were
adopted at the European level, with the establishment of nancial regulatory and supervi-
sory institutions. At the same time there was a debate still ongoing - on the opportunity
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to impose a nancial taxation, without concrete policy action (Cortez and Vogel, 2011).
As pointed out earlier the stance strongly in favor of regulation may be explained by
the measurement bias. Since taxation is more subject to such bias, policy makers prefer
regulation in order to produce progressive e¤ects on risk curbing. This also explains why
so far proposals for a wide reconguration of nancial taxation have followed principles
which are di¤erent from a proper SRE taxation scheme. In fact, taxes on banks are usually
levied on ex-post basis; they are mostly based on funding, prots, or banking bonuses,
rather than stricter measures of systemic risk. In some cases, nancial taxes are part of a
general taxation design (Lockwood, 2010), or they are aimed to facilitate the macroeconomic
management of aggregate demand (Tobin, 1978). In other cases, proposals have concerned
taxes that would ensure that banks bear the direct nancial costs of bailouts, or which make
the implementation of bankruptcy schemes possible (Claessens et al., 2010).
It appears from the current debate that, while the most preferred instrument to prevent
SRE is regulation, nancial taxation is mostly aimed at facing ex post the consequences
of systemic risk rather than preventing externalities ex ante. In other words, no proposal
on nancial taxation so far has followed a pure and coherent SRE principle. There is a
proliferation of taxes on specic issues (securities transactions, currency transactions, capital
levies, bank transactions, insurance premia, real estate transactions,...) which hardly t into
a coherent framework of systemic risk reduction.2
Finally, the international coordination argument has been used to over-emphasize the
risks of discrepancies among di¤erent national jurisdictions in setting and implementing
nancial taxation policies, with the consequence of the race to the bottomphenomenon,
since nancial globalization increases the likelihood of nancial cross-border arbitrage.
In this paper we try to explain this sort of aversion towards SRE taxation. We argue that
in a democracy citizens/voters are heterogeneous in the toxicity of their portfolios. They are
a¤ected by SRE taxation and regulation in a di¤erent way. Thus they have heterogeneous
2See Matheson (2011) for a complete survey.
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preferences regarding the two instruments and their levels. Considering these preferences
into a political economy model allows us to explore the political distortions that occur when
the societys decision on systemic risk is made through voting. The occurrence of political
distortions may help explaining why taxation of systemic risk is unlikely to be implemented
and why, if implemented, it is unlikely to be e¢ cient.
3. The model
Consider a continuum of investors/voters, and denote with i a generic agent. Each in-
vestor/voter makes a portfolio choice. Systemic risk derives from individual portfolio choices.
We assume that a certain amount of systemic risk is associated to the nancial instruments
in any possible portfolio. Call ti, or type i, the risk produced when i chooses his most
preferred portfolio. In a sense ti is a measure of the pollutingactivity of investor i when
his portfolio choice is not constrained whatsoever. We say that i is a hightype when the
risk of his most preferred portfolio is high, and vice versa. A high type is an investor who
unilaterally chooses a portfolio with a large amount of toxicity. This occurs either because
the portfolio includes many toxic assets or because the portfolio is quite large, in the sense
that it includes a large quantity of nancial instruments with a low average level of toxicity.
For example, suppose that is type is ti = 45 . This means that is most preferred portfolio
contains instruments that produce a total 4
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of systemic risk. On the contrary, we say that
i is a low type, when ti is low; that is, he prefers a small, low toxicity portfolio.
Let ti 2 [0; 1]. Types as locations in the unit interval. Let F (t) be the distribution of
types in [0; 1]. This function describes how systemic risk is produced across the population
when investors choose their most preferred portfolios. For example, a rightward slanted
distribution means that there are relatively few big risk producers, whereas the majority of
investors own small portfolios and prefers non-toxic instruments. Assume for simplicity that
the population has unit measure: F (1) = 1.
Call bi the amount of systemic risk associated to is actual portfolio choice. By denition,
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an investor maximizes his utility when his actual choice is his most preferred portfolio; in
this case bi = ti. Making a di¤erent portfolio choice with bi 6= ti entails a disutility, which we
describe here with a cost function that is increasing and quadratic in the distance between
bi and ti:3
c(bi; ti) = (jbi   tij)2 (1)
For example, if the high type in ti = 45 actually chooses a portfolio with a lower toxicity
level, say bi = 35 , he bears a cost which amounts to c(
3
5
; 4
5
) =
 3
5
  4
5
2 = 1
25
.
Let " be the externality, or the social cost, of the systemic risk produced by is actual
portfolio toxicity, bi. Assume that the externality function is linear in systemic risk:4
"(bi) =  bi
Thus, if is actual portfolio toxicity is bi = 35 , the externality amounts to  35 . Had he
chosen his ti portfolio, the externality would have been  45 . The idea is that if an investor
produces an amount of systemic risk that is lower than his type ( bi < ti), he generates a
lower externality. This is a social benet that spreads over the population. In this case,
however, he bears a private sacrice given by (1). Let G(b) : [0; 1] ! < be the distribution
of investors actual portfolio choices. This function illustrates how systemic risk is actually
produced within the population. Investor is utility function is:
Ui =  
Z 1
0
bdG(b)  (jbi   tij)2 (2)
The integral is the amount of loss that i su¤ers from the actual portfolio choices of the
entire population (including himself); i.e. the negative externality that he receives. The
3A fundamental assumption is that the cost function is convex. Assuming that it is also quadratic greatly
simplies calculus.
4Also the linearity of " is a simplifying assumption. The main results are not a¤ected by this assumption.
Alesina and Passarelli (2010) use a more general externality function which leads to similar results.
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quadratic term is the private sacrice that he makes in choosing bi instead of ti. Of course,
there is no incentive to choose bi > ti. Moreover, since individuals are innitesimal in the
population, the private benet that anyone obtains from choosing bi < ti is innitesimal too.
Hence, nobody has any incentive to reduce unilaterally his portfolios systemic risk below
his type. Therefore, bi = ti for all i. This means that, for any t, in equilibrium G(t) = F (t)
and nobody bears any costs. Thus is equilibrium utility is:
Ui =  
Z 1
0
tdF (t) (3)
A free-rider problem emerges as a result of the possible discrepancy between private and
social benets from externality reductions. Investors make portfolio choices with too much
systemic risk production. There is scope for government intervention in terms of either
regulation or taxation.
Observe that we can omit the index in (3), Ui = U ; i.e. equilibrium utility is the same
for everybody. Moreover, since the population size is one, U represents individual utility,
per-capita utility, and laissez-faire welfare in the society.
Example 1. As it will become clear later, much of our results depend on the distribution of risk
polluters in society, namely the F (t) function. Let us make an example with two alternative dis-
tributions in two di¤erent countries. All over the paper, this example will serve as an illustration
for what is going on. We will keep returning to it in the following Sections.
Suppose there are two countries, A and B, with two di¤erent populations of investors/risk produc-
ers. Financial markets in these two countries are completely separated. In country A the production
of risk is uniformly distributed over the population of investors, say FA(t) = t. Country B dis-
plays a concentration of low-risk investors; assume FB(t) =
p
t. Free riding implies that these
distributions also represent the equilibrium behavior within the two countries.
According to (3), individual utility is UAi =  
R 1
0
tdt =  1
2
in country A, and it is UBi =
  R 1
0
td
p
t =  1
3
in country B. As pointed out earlier,  1
2
and  1
3
are also the laissez-faire
welfare levels within the two countries:
WA =  0:5 and WB =  0:333
Of course, welfare is higher in country B because of a larger number of low-risk portfolio owners;
i.e., a lower amount of systemic risk produced..
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4. SRE regulation
By nancial regulation we denote a policy that directly aims to prevent nancial insti-
tutions from issuing instruments with too much systemic risk. The supply of large SRE
instruments is strongly limited, therefore investors with those kind of assets in their portfo-
lios will have to make substantial changes. Arguably, this kind of policy has a quite strong
impact on highly pollutingportfolios while it only moderately a¤ects the low toxicity ones.
We can formalize this idea in our model by assuming that regulation forces investors
to more than proportional reductions in systemic risk production. In other words, for any
ti, actual risk production, bi, has to decrease more than proportionally. Call  the policy
parameter that measures the regulation level (with 0    1). Once  is enforced individual
i must reduce systemic risk and choose a portfolio with bi such that:
bi(ti; ) = (1    ti)  ti: (4)
For instance, suppose that  = 0:5. For a low-risk type with tl = 15 actual risk production
decreases to bl = 0:18, with a 10% risk reduction. For a high-risk type with th = 45 actual
risk production becomes bh = 0:48, with a 40% reduction. Formulation (4) is mainly for
mathematical convenience. More sophisticated or realistic descriptions of progressive e¤ects
of regulation do not change results substantially. The idea is that, for any level of the
regulation parameter, risk production decreases more than proportionally for larger ti. Of
course, the harsher the regulation, the stronger this e¤ect.
The decision regarding the level of the regulation parameter is made by voting. The
timing sequence is the following: at time 1, given the distribution of types F (t), individuals
compute their preferences regarding ; at time 2, they select a Condorcet winner in simple
majority voting; at time 3, they choose their portfolios and their pollution levels, bi.5
5A Condorcet winner is a level of regulation that cannot be beaten by any alternative level in an open-
agenda pair-wise competition (for details, see Persson and Tabellini, 2002).
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Each agent/voter computes his preferences regarding the regulation level, , knowing that
once  has been enforced, everyone will have to reduce their risk production according to (4),
and he will have to bear a compliance cost. Therefore, individual is policypreferences
can be computed by plugging (4), which serves as an incentive constraint, into the utility
function, (2):
Vi() =  
Z 1
0
t    t2dF (t)  2t4i (5)
Maximizing (5) yields is most preferred rule, which is the solution of the following FOC:
Z 1
0
t2dF (t) = 2t4i (6)
Convexity of the cost function takes care of the SOC. The most preferred rule is set where
the private benet due to a marginal increase in the rule parameter (the left-hand side of
(6)) equals the marginal private cost of complying with the rule (the right-hand side).
Let us solve the voting stage. Since all Vis are single peaked, each voter i has one single
most preferred regulation level, or bliss point, call it i :
i =
R 1
0
t2dF (t)
2t4i
(7)
Observe that bliss points are negatively related to types. An investor with a highly polluting
portfolio (high ti) wants a low rule (low i), and vice versa. The reason is simple. Hetero-
geneity in policy preferences is only due to di¤erences in costs. Private benets are the same
for all, but for any rule level a higher type bears larger private costs. Since costs are convex
individuals utility is maximized with a lower rule. Since preferences are single peaked, there
is no room for strategic voting and there is a single equilibrium level for , the Condorcet
winner, which is the level preferred by the median. This regulation level wins against any
other level in pair-wise comparisons, and it is the median types most preferred level (Black,
1948). Call tm the median type. The regulation level which is selected by majority voting
12
is:
m =
R 1
0
t2dF (t)
2t4m
(8)
Let us look at the e¢ ciency of this policy outcome. Let W () be the Benthamite social
welfare function, which is given by the sum of individual utilities:
W () =  
Z 1
0
t    t2dF (t) 
Z 1
0
2t4dF (t) (9)
The rst integral in W () is the total externality and the second integral represents to-
tal compliance costs. W () captures the social loss due to systemic risk plus the cost of
complying with regulation. A higher level of W () implies a lower social loss.
Di¤erently from the median voter, the Social Planner takes all individuals costs into
consideration. The socially optimal rule, , maximizes W (); therefore:
 =
R 1
0
t2dF (t)
2
R 1
0
t4dF (t)
(10)
The di¤erence between m and 
can be viewed as a political distortiondue to voting.
We say that regulation adopted by the majority is too restrictive if m > 
; vice versa,
regulation is too permissive if m < 
.
By comparing (8) with (10) we can see that regulation is too restrictive if:
t4m <
Z 1
0
t4dF (t)
Let us discuss this condition. Observe that t4 is a convex transformation of t. By Jensens
inequality, we have that
R 1
0
t4dF (t) > t4, where t is the average type. This means that if
tm < t, then the condition for the rule to be too restrictive is satised for sure; in fact
t4m < t
4 <
R 1
0
t4dF (t). In other words, a median lower than the average is a su¢ cient
condition for the emergence of an excessively restrictive rule. Consequently, excessively
restrictive regulation occurs also if the median is only slightly above the average. It is easy
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to see that with more convex costs, the rule is too restrictive even if the median is consistently
above the average. This result is not a¤ected by the assumption of linear externalities.
The main idea is that when nancial regulation is decided through voting, a too restrictive
policy is rather likely to emerge. Even if the median voter owns a portfolio which pollutes
more than the average, he may opportunistically choose too restrictive of a rule in order
to force the minority of top polluters to substantial portfolio changes. The reason is that
regulation mostly impacts on top risk investors, forcing them to large adjustments in their
portfolio choices. The median voter does not consider the cost incurred by top risk producers
in his voting calculations. He rather looks at regulation as a way to o­ oad to them the main
burden of systemic risk reduction.
Thus voting on nancial regulation is likely to yield too socially restrictive rules. Ine¢ -
ciency in voting outcomes is larger when costs are more convex and when the median is in a
relatively low position with respect to the highest types. Let us nd numerical evidence of
this result by comparing the voting outcomes in the two countries of our example above.
Example 2. Consider country A. The socially optimal rule can be computed using the (10), where
the distribution is FA(t) = t. The Social Planner would choose A =
R 1
0
t2dt=(2
R 1
0
t4dt) = 0:83.
Let us compute what the majority decides. In country A the median voter is also the average
risk producer, tAm = t
A = 1
2
. Plugging this value into (8) yields a rule  = 2:6. Since policy
is constrained in [0; 1], the actual policy outcome is Am = 1. This conrms that the rule is too
restrictive even in a population where the median risk producer equals the average.
In country B risk producers are distributed according to FB(t) =
p
t. The median is lower than
the average: tBm =
1
4
< 1
3
= tB. Also in this country we expect a policy level that is too restrictive.
In fact, the Social Planner would adopt B = 0:9. The median voter is constrained to choose the
maximum rule Bm = 1.
Observe that it is not surprising that in the second country the Social Planner wants a stricter
rule. Those who pollute a lot are fewer, the social cost of reducing risk pollution is lower. Thus the
country can a¤orda stricter rule.
Social optimum in country A is computed by plugging A into (9). This yields,
WA(A = 0:83) =  
Z 1
0
t  0:83t2dt 
Z 1
0
0:832t4dt =  0:36
Skipping the calculations we have made for other cases we have
WA(A = 0:83) =  0:36 and WB(B = 0:9) =  0:243
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whereas the voting outcomes yield
WA(Am = 1) =  0:37 and WB(Bm = 1) =  0:244
The welfare loss due to political distortion is 0:01 in country A and it is lower, 0:001, in country B.
The reason is that there is a lower di¤erence between the Social Planners choice and the majoritys
choice in country B than in country A
5. SRE taxation
An SRE tax aims to increase the private cost of systemic risk production. The problem
with this instrument is that usually risk is not easy to measure. As pointed out earlier, the
tax is often levied on biased measures of SRE, as for example the monetary value of nancial
transactions. This is largely referred to as the Tobin tax, and it is being widely discussed
as a result of a generalized demand to curb nancial systemic risk, after the 2008 subprime
crisis. With this kind of tax, investors who do the same amount of nancial transactions
pay the same amount of tax, independently of actual systemic risk produced. Thus this tax
is charged on a biased risk measure and realistically it is likely to have a regressive impact:
those who pollute more pay less in proportion to risk.
We show that taxing a biased measure of risk is not only socially ine¢ cient, but may also
lead to a di¤erent type of political distortion. We start by exploring what the Social Planner
would do if it could tax risk directly (Section 5.1). Then we look at what it actually does
when it taxes transactions (Section 5.2). This gives rise to a rst source of distortion, due to
the adoption of a biased measure of risk. The second is political distortion, due to the fact
that the median voter makes a di¤erent choice with respect to the Social Planner (Section
5.3). We show that political distortion is smaller when the median voter has to decide about
a tax on transactions, rather than a tax on risk.
5.1. Tax on systemic risk
Consider the following policy benchmark. Suppose that the Social Planner is able to
detect and tax the true systemic risk in every portfolio. The tax is charged on the actual
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externality level produced by each single investor. A basic result in optimal taxation theory
applies here: welfare is maximized if, for any agent, after-tax private marginal cost equals
the social marginal externality. Since in our model the marginal externality is independent
of ti, the optimal tax must ensure that marginal costs are the same for all investors. Assume
that preferences are quasi-linear in money, a standard assumption in taxation theory. The
optimality condition is satised by a proportional tax with lump-sum refunds of proceeds.
To show this, call  the tax rate; i.e. the per-unit tax of systemic risk. Given  , every
investor i optimizes his portfolio by choosing a risk level bi(ti; ) such that the marginal cost
of reducing risk in his portfolio equals the tax per unit of risk: c0(ti   bi) =  . Therefore,
after-tax optimal risk choice is:
2(ti   bi) =  :
The after-tax risk production, as a function of type and tax rate, is:
bi(ti; ) = ti   =2 (11)
This is an IC constraint which illustrates how every type of investor reacts to a proportional
tax  . Since costs are quadratic, it turns out that all investors reduce systemic risk in their
portfolios by the same amount, =2. For example, an investor in ti = 0:8 will react to a
 = 0:4 risk tax by reducing risk in his portfolio down to bi = 0:6.
As a result of a tax, total systemic risk in the society is lowered by =2; i.e. b = t  =2.
The socially optimal tax,  , must ensure that total marginal cost equals total marginal
externality, provided that, for every i, individual risk choice satises the IC constraint in
(11). Optimal taxation level can be computed by solving the following equation:
Z 1
0
["0b j bi = ti   =2] dF (t) =
Z 1
0
[c0b j bi = ti   =2] dF (t) (12)
The marginal externality in the left-hand side is  1. The marginal cost in the right-hand
16
side is   . Equation (12) is simply  1 =   .6 Thus the socially optimal tax rate is,
  = 1 (13)
This is a rst-best, that is achieved thanks to the governments ability to detect and tax
actual systemic risk production.
The policy runs as follows. The government sells (i.e. taxes) for one dollar a unit
of systemic risk (  = 1). Individual tax burden is proportional to the risk produced:
   bi = bi. All investors reduce risk by 12 and pay for the residual risk production. Thus
they all bear the same marginal cost, and the social optimum is ensured. Proceeds are
lump-sum redistributed. Per capita refund amounts to b, where b is the after-tax average
risk produced. Observe that b = t   1
2
and b also measures rst-best social welfare. Total
risk is cut by 1
2
, which is the socially optimal reduction.
Thanks to quasi-linear preferences, this tax schedule solves the Mirrlees problem. Thus,
the schedule would be optimal even if types were not observable. The government does not
need to know anything about the cost incurred by every single agent in reducing risk in his
portfolio.
As for the assumption of linear externalities, no big changes occur if one removes it. The
Social Planner can establish a nice non-linear tax schedule such that the (variable) marginal
systemic risk produced by each agent equals the marginal tax rate.
Example 3. Let us resume the example and compute social welfare with the rst-best policy com-
puted above,   = 1. In both countries all investors reduce their risk production by 1
2
.
For country A the formula for the rst-best welfare is:
WA(  = 1) =  
Z 1
0

t  1
2

dt 
Z 1
0

1
2
2
dt =  0:25
observe that, in order to get rid of corner solutions, investors with ti <
1
2
are let choose portfolios
with bi < 0. This is for mathematical convenience, however it is not in contrast with the main idea
6More precisely, since "0b =  1, the LHS is  
R 1
0
dF (t) =  1. As for the RHS, observe that c0b =  2(ti bi).
Plugging the IC and taking the integral, the RHS becomes  2 R 1
0
(ti   (ti   =2))d:F (t) =   .
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because the externality remains negative ("0 < 0 even if bi < 0).
For country B,
WB(  = 1) =  
Z 1
0

t  1
2

d
p
t 
Z 1
0

1
2
2
d
p
t =  0:083
Notice that welfare improves in both countries. Taxation at the rst-best level yields higher welfare
with respect to regulation. As for cost convexity it is easy to show that if c = (t  b), with  > 1,
nothing changes. Some changes may occur with more complex cost functions.
5.2. Tax on transactions: the measurement bias
As pointed out earlier, the problem with a tax is that in reality it is levied on biased
measures of systemic risk. Here we consider a tax on nancial transactions. In order to
study this kind of tax we have to specify how the tax is related to the risk being produced.
Arguably, systemic risk in a portfolio is due to two factors: rst, the number of toxic assets;
second, the portfolio size, i.e. the amount of transactions made by the investor. With a
proportional transaction tax, however, an investor pays only according to the second factor.
This means that a proportional transaction tax does not bear on the full amount of the
externality produced. Thus we can realistically assume that a tax proportional to nancial
transactions is de facto regressive with respect to the externality produced.
Let us formalize this idea. Denote by  the transaction tax rate. A tax is regressive if
marginal taxation of risk decreases in the risk produced, bi. Assume a simple linear relation.
The tax rate on risk equals the transaction tax, , minus a linear measure of bi; specically,
  1

bi

. Parameter  is a measure of the amount of systemic risk that is actually taxed
through the transaction tax . High values of  imply that transactions are a good proxy
of risk. With a tax levied on transactions the amount of, say, tax-free risk is rather limited.
In a sense,  inversely captures the distortion due to measurement bias.
Let us compute the socially optimal transaction tax, when there is a measurement bias.
The tax burden of investor i on a portfolio that produces bi units of risk is

  1

bi

 bi.
The investor chooses the risk content in his portfolio in order to minimize the private cost
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of reducing risk plus the tax burden. Therefore bi is chosen in order to minimize
(ti   bi)2 +

  1

bi

 bi
The rst term is the cost of reducing risk to bi; the second term is the tax paid on bi, taking
into account the regressive impact of the measurement bias. Optimization with respect to bi
implies that the marginal cost from reducing risk equals the marginal tax: c0(ti bi) =   2 bi.
From the solution of this equation we get the investors IC, which illustrates the after-tax
portfolio choices as a function of the individual type and the transaction tax:
bi(ti; ) =

   1 (ti   =2) (14)
We assume that  > 1. Then ti   bi is decreasing in ti. This means that a large investor
reduces his risk production by less than a small one. The reason is regressivity: a larger risk
polluter has to pay lower marginal tax on risk, thus he reduces risk production by a lower
amount. Further observe that as the measurement bias becomes negligible (i.e.  !1), a
transaction tax leads to the same portfolio choice as a tax on risk.7
The tax chosen by the government maximizes social welfare, subject to the individual
optimization constraint in (14). The FOC is:
Z 1
0

"0b j bi =

   1 (ti   =2)

dF (t) =
Z 1
0

c0b j bi =

   1 (ti   =2)

dF (t) (15)
As for the tax on risk the marginal externality in the left-hand side is just  1. As for the
right-hand side, let us plug equation (14) into the marginal cost function and compute the
integral:  2 R 1
0
(ti  


 1 (ti   =2)

dF (t). Solving the equation yields the governments
7The assumption that  > 1 will be needed to solve the voting stage in Section 5.3.2. With this spec-
ication, we also need a condition on parameter : after-tax risk must be lower than pre-tax risk; i.e.,
bi(ti; ) < ti, where bi(ti; ) is given by (14). This condition is satised when  > 2 .
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most preferred transaction tax, call it :
 =

1  1


+
2

t (16)
This tax is a second-best. Taxing transactions forces the government to adopt a tax
that is de facto regressive in the externality, whereas the rst-best instrument would be a
proportional tax. Departure from rst-best occurs because the government taxes a distorted
measure of risk. Suppose t < 1
2
, the di¤erence between rst and second-best increases in the
measurement bias. If the latter is large, the ability to tax externalities through transactions
is low (i.e.  is low), thus  is substantially lower than  . The reason is that the Social
Planner does not want to "overtax" low types, who are the bulk of the population. The vice
versa happens if t > 1
2
.
Interestingly, when t = 1
2
, rst and second-best tax levels are the same:  =  . Notice,
however, that ine¢ ciency occurs in any case: despite the fact that the tax rate is optimal,
its impact on risk production is distorted by the fact that tax rate has regressive impact on
risk reduction. We will provide numerical evidence below.
Summing up, when the Social Planner adopts a tax on nancial transactions, it cannot
implement the rst-best. The reason is that a distorted measure of risk is used as the
taxation base. Top risk polluters do not pay enough taxes; their private marginal cost is too
low, compared to the marginal externalities produced, and vice versa low-risk polluters pay
too much. Specically, the second-best level of the tax is too low when the average type is
enough low.8
Example 4. Let us compute the second-best tax rates and social welfare levels within the two
countries. Recall that in country A the average type is tA = 1
2
. Therefore, A = 1, as in the
rst-best case. This is independent of . Assume there is a severe measurement bias,  = 4. By
(14), after-tax portfolio choice is bi =
4
3
(ti   1=2). In country A, the welfare with the second-best
tax is:
WA(A = 1) =  
Z 1
0
4
3

t  1
2

dt 
Z 1
0
t  4
3

t  1
2
2
dt =  0:259
8By comparing (13) with (16) it is easy to see that  <  if t < 12 .
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Recall that the rst-best welfare level computed in Section 5.1 is WA(  = 1) =  0:25. Taxing
transactions instead of risk causes a lower gain in country A which amounts to 0:009. Observe that,
although the tax rate is the same, welfare is lower because of regressivity. This provides evidence of
what we pointed out earlier.
From (16), country Bs tax rate is B = 11=12. By (14), after-tax risk production is bi =
4
3
(ti   11=24). The second-best welfare in country B is:
WB(B =
11
12
) =  
Z 1
0
4
3

t  11
24

d
p
t 
Z 1
0

t  4
3

t  11
24
2
d
p
t =  0:093
Not surprisingly, also in country B welfare level is lower with a transaction tax than with a tax on
risk ( 0:093 instead of  0:083).
5.3. Political distortions
This Section studies the political distortions that may occur when the decision about
taxes is made through voting. We start with Subsection 5.3.1, which considers the case in
which a proportional tax is levied on risk production directly. There is no measurement
bias in this case. Then we proceed with Subsection 5.3.2, which explores voting on nancial
transactions, where a measurement bias occurs. We will see that the political distortion in
this case counteracts the distortion due to measurement bias.
5.3.1. Tax on risk
In the absence of measurement bias, risk is taxed directly and the Social Planner chooses
the rst-best tax rate   = 1. Below we show that, unsurprisingly, the majority possibly
chooses a di¤erent tax rate. Thus there is political distortion.
Recall that tax revenues are lump-sum redistributed out of a balanced government bud-
get. Every individual receives a refund that is equal to the average tax burden  b. Investor
is indirect utility is:
Vi() =  
Z 1
0
bdF (t)  (ti   bi)2     (bi   b) (17)
Recall also that, for any given  , each individual reduces the amount of risk in his portfolio
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by =2, as in (11). In other words, behavior in (17) depends on  , in the way that is specied
by the IC constraint in (11). Each investor i chooses his most preferred tax rate in order
to maximize (17) subject to (11). Let us substitute the IC constraint into (17) and then
compute the FOC:
Vi() =  
Z 1
0
(t  
2
)dF (t)  (ti   (ti   
2
))2     ((ti   
2
)  (t  
2
))
The FOC is:
1
2
  
2
+ (t  ti) = 0
The SOC is immediately satised, therefore solving the FOC yields is most preferred tax
rate,  i :
 i = 1 + 2(t  ti)
The  is represent votersbliss points. They are decreasing in ti. Higher types pay larger
amounts of taxes because their after-tax risk production is higher, thus they want lower tax
rates. Since bliss points are unique and inverse-monotone in types, the majority chooses the
medians bliss point:
 m = 1 + 2(t  tm) (18)
The di¤erence between  m and 
 is a measure of the political distortion due to majority
decision. Recall that   = 1, thus the political distortion is:
 m     = 2(t  tm) (19)
If the median type is below (above) the average, the majority chooses a tax rate that is
too high (too low). Political distortion occurs because the amount of taxes preferred by the
median risk producer are di¤erent from those preferred by the average one. For example, a
low median has an incentive to x a high rate in order to have others paying for a larger
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share of the cost of reducing systemic risk. No political distortion occurs only if the medians
risk production equals the average. This result on systemic risk taxation is similar to a well-
known result in the public nance literature on income taxation (Roberts, 1977; Meltzer
and Richard, 1981). When the government is able to tax systemic risk, political distortion
is only determined by the di¤erence between the median and the mean of the population
distribution. Consider that this elegant result relies on two important assumptions, quadratic
costs and linear externalities.9
Example 5. Let us compute the tax adopted by the majority. In country A the median risk
producer equals the average. Thus, according to (19), voting yields a rst-best: the tax rate is one.
We already computed social welfare for this case:
WA( A =  Am = 1) =  0:25
As expected, no loss due to political distortion occurs.
In country B, the median is lower than the average (tBm =
1
4
< 1
3
= tB). There will be a distortion.
According to (18), the policy outcome is  Bm =
7
6
. According to (11) investors reduce risk in their
portfolios by 7
12
. Therefore welfare is
WB( Bm =
7
6
) =  1
2
Z 1
0
(t  7
12
)d
p
t  1
2
Z 1
0

7
12
2
d
p
t =  0:09
In country B political distortion occurs. It results from the di¤erence between the average and the
median in FB(t). There is a welfare loss ( 0:09 instead of  0:083, which is the rst-best computed
in Section 5.1 above).
5.3.2. Tax on transactions
Consider now the majority decision when the tax, , is levied on nancial transactions.
A measurement bias occurs: systemic risk is not entirely taxed. As pointed out earlier, the
tax has a regressive e¤ect. Let us explore how this kind of e¤ect a¤ects votersdecision and
which kind of political distortion, if any, occurs.
Individual policy preference is the same as (17). The di¤erence is in the IC constraint;
regressivity causes a di¤erent reaction to the tax. With a transaction tax, individualsafter-
9Specically, when cost are more convex (i.e. c000 > 0), even a median equal to the average prefers a tax
rate that is too high.
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tax risk production is given by (14). Taking this IC as a constraint in utility maximization,
we get the following objective function.
Vi() =  
Z 1
0
(

   1 (ti   =2))dF (t)  (ti  

   1 (ti   =2))
2     
   1(ti  
t)
The FOC is:
@Vi()
@
=
1
2
+
ti
   1  

   1

2
+ (t  ti) = 0
The SOC is satised if  > 1, which we assumed already. Solving for  yields is most
preferred transaction tax:
i =

1  1


+
2

ti + 2(1  1

)(t  ti)
The bliss points are decreasing in ti. Then the transaction tax chosen by the majority is the
one preferred by the median type:
m =

1  1


+
2

tm + 2(1  1

)(t  tm) (20)
The di¤erence between the median voters tax, m, and the Social Planners tax, 
,
gives a hint of where the political distortion comes from. Subtracting (16) form (20) yields:
m    =
4

(tm   t) + 2(t  tm) (21)
The political distortion is given by the sum of the two terms in the right-hand side of
(21). This rst term is positively related to the relative position of the median. The reason is
that a high median is temptedto choose a high tax rate since his marginal cost of reducing
risk decreases because of regressivity. The second term is the usualpolitical distortion, as
in (19), and it works in the opposite direction: a high median wants a low tax rate since he
pays a large amount of taxes.
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The net political distortion results from this trade-o¤. Interestingly, the solution to the
trade-o¤ depends on parameter . If  < 2 the tax is too low when tm < t. The usual
political distortion prevails on the distortion due to regressivity. The idea is that when the
ability to tax systemic risk through a transaction tax is su¢ ciently high (i.e.  > 2), the
low position of the median, rather than regressivity, plays a major role.
Example 6. Let us verify these results returning to the numerical example. Recall that  = 4. In
Country A, t = tm. According to (21) the median chooses the socially optimal level: Am = 
A =
1. No political distortion occurs. However the rst-best is not achieved because of regressivity.
Voting yields the Social Planners second-best, that we computed earlier:
WA(Am = 
A = 1) =  0:259
In country B, since  > 2, we expect the usual political distortion to occur. In fact, from (20)
we nd that Bm = 1, instead of the second-best level, 
B = 11
12
. From (14), the IC is bi =
4
3
(ti   1=2). Therefore:
WB(Bm = 1) =  
Z 1
0
4
3

t  1
2

d
p
t 
Z 1
0

t  4
3

t  1
2
2
dt =  0:096
The welfare loss due to political distortion (i.e. WB(Bm = 1)   WB(B = 1112)) amounts to 0:03.
Let us compare political distortion in the case of a transaction tax, with political dis-
tortion in case of regulation. Consider the most interesting case: transactions are a poor
measure of risk,  < 2. Suppose the median is lower than the average. A rule is always too
restrictive: a low median uses regulation as a tool to charge high-risk investors the largest
share of total cost, but this causes social welfare loss. By contrast, a tax is too low: due to
tax regressivity a low median must pay large amounts of tax and thus he prefers too low a
tax level.
This relationship between political distortion and the medians position is continuous. If
the median is moderately above the average, regulation is too restrictive and taxation is too
permissive. With a very high median both regulation and taxation are too permissive.
Summing up, with both policy tools majority voting yields political distortion. This may
cause large ine¢ ciency losses. However, the distortion is considerably di¤erent when voting
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concerns taxation instead of regulation, especially if there is a problem of measurement
bias. Too restrictive regulation is more likely to emerge than too restrictive taxation. The
reason being that regulation is a progressive mechanism, whereas taxation on transactions
is regressive. Thus, on the one hand a relatively low median voter, who is not necessarily
below the average, prefers restrictive regulation in order to force higher types to large risk
reductions; on the other hand, he prefers a low taxation rate because otherwise he would
have to pay high taxes.
6. The choice of policy instrument
Suppose now that the majority determines not only the level of the policy, but also which
instrument to adopt. We can realistically assume that voting takes place sequentially: rst,
the majority selects the policy instrument; then it chooses its level.10 Voters know that,
whatever the instrument, the level that will pass at the second stage is the one preferred
by the median. Every voter compares his own utility in both cases, and chooses his most
preferred instrument. At the rst stage, the majority behaves as a Stackelberg leader: it
selects the instrument and it lets a possibly di¤erent majority choose the level at the second
stage. There is no scope for strategic voting.
When does the majority choose a rule at the rst stage? A low-pollution investor has
to make small adjustments to comply with the rule, whereas with the tax he has to pay a
relatively large amount, due to regressivity. Thus he prefers a rule. A top-pollution type
has reversed preferences: a tax is better than a rule because with a tax a larger share of the
burden of systemic risk reduction is transferred to low-pollution investors.
A likely scenario is that if the number of low-risk portfolios is su¢ ciently large, then a
10In general, with bi-dimensional policy issues the existence of a Condorcet winner cannot be taken for
granted. However, with sequential voting in which the rst issue is binary this problem does not arise.
Consider that with bi-dimensional sequential voting the outcome is sensitive to the voting sequence. In
our situation we do not have such a problem. An inverse sequence in which the majority decides the
instrument after having decided the level of policy is quite innatural. For an exaustive analysis of sequential
bi-dimensional voting, see De Donder et al. (2010).
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majority in favor of the rule will arise. Observe that we do not require that the median is
below the average in this case. If the rule is strongly progressive then also moderately high-
risk portfolio owners will prefer it. Vice versa, high-pollution investors prefer a regressive
tax to a rule. If regressivity is stronger more moderate types prefer the tax. Thus a majority
in favor of a tax will form only if it is strongly regressive with respect to the rule and the
population of low-risk investors is relatively small.
Let us consider the normative characteristics of these positive results. In our model
the social cost of systemic risk is linear. Thus, the Social Planner is not interested in who
produces the externality, it is rather interested in choosing an instrument that shares the costs
evenly. A rule is strongly progressive: the cost is concentrated on high-risk investors. Vice
versa, a tax levied on a biased risk measure may be regressive; thus the cost is concentrated
on low polluters. The socially optimal instrument is a tax if regressivity is not too high; i.e.
if the measurement bias is not too strong.
Consider however, that when the measurement bias causes strong regressivity or when
the distribution is slanted towards highly polluting portfolios a majority of voters prefers the
rule. In this case a double political distortion occurs. First, the majority selects the wrong
instrument: regulation instead of a taxation. Second, the majority of low polluters chooses
a too restrictive level of regulation.
Example 7. Let us provide numerical evidence of the double distortion. Let us compute the
utility of the median in country A, at the equilibrium rule and at the equilibrium transaction tax,
respectively:
Vm(
A
m = 1) =  
R 1
0
(t  t2) dt  1
16
=  0:23
and
Vm(
A
m = 1) =  
R 1
0
4
3
 
t  1
2

dt  1
4
=  0:25
Of course the median would choose regulation.
The Social Planner would rather choose a transaction tax. Social welfare would be larger with a tax:
WA(A = 1) =  0:259 rather than WA(A = 0:83) =  0:36. Regressivity is not su¢ cient to
lead the Social Planner to prefer the rule.
It is easy to see that in this case majorities at the rst and second stage do not "mix up"; i.e. the
median voter is pivotal both when the instrument is decided and when the level is set.
Observe that the majority prefers the wrong instrument although the distribution of types is sym-
metric. This conrms our theoretical results.
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7. Conclusions
The main point in this paper is that when policies to reduce nancial systemic risk are
made through voting, the political aspects of decision-making are quite relevant and may
cause signicant distortions. These distortions are substantially di¤erent when taxation
rather than regulation is considered.
We approach systemic risk contagion as an externality issue and we consider it as a gen-
eral interest policy. In a sense, everybody is interested in reducing systemic risk and, as a
consequence of the policy, all investors must readjust their own portfolio or bear a cost. If
regulation is adopted, most costs and adjustments are shouldered by high-risk producers;
with taxation, sacrices are more evenly distributed across the population. Political dis-
tortions hinge on the distribution of sacrices of the externality reduction. A majority of
small portfolio owners with low-risk production will tend to choose regulation in order to
concentrate sacrices on high-risk producers. Even a median that is above the average might
prefer regulation, provided it has a su¢ ciently progressive e¤ect on risk adjustments.
We show that regulation may be highly ine¢ cient. In particular, majorities tend to
choose too restrictive regulation. Loosely speaking, if "risk is due to everybody" (as in
the case where externalities are linearly related to risk), and the cost of complying with
regulation grows at a fast rate, concentrating risk reduction on top risk producers is not
socially optimal. However, if the majority is made by low-risk producers, the decision will
be harsh regulation.
With a tax, the political distortion is quite di¤erent. Systemic risk is reduced by taxing
distorted measures of risk, such as transactions, intermediariesprots or their turnover. We
argue that a tax is likely to yield a regressive e¤ect: small risk producers pay proportionally
more than large risk producers. As a consequence, a majority of small risk producers has
less incentive to choose a tax; if this is the case, it will choose a too low tax level. This
political economy argument is possibly helpful to understand the current reality in which
taxes on risky nancial instruments are usually rare and low, whereas nancial regulation is
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much more frequent.
Of course there might be many other circumstances, not considered in this paper, that
explain the frequency and e¢ ciency of policies. For example, taxes can be better calibrated
to nancial activity, and produce more gradual externality reductions. From a normative
viewpoint, taxation is preferable when contribution to systemic risk is more evenly distrib-
uted across nancial instruments and investors. Vice versa, regulation is more e¤ective when
there are information concerns. If risk production is private information, a rule that limits
specic nancial activities is more e¤ective than a tax on those activities.
Financial risk externalities are also an international issue. In these circumstances common
decisions rely on the existence of institutions that ensure a su¢ cient degree of coordination
among parties. Incentives and enforceability issues may severely limit the set of available
policy options and distort common decision-making.
Finally, one might object that a specic interest lobbying model à la Stigler is possibly
more appropriate to address politico-economic issues in nancial markets. Financial interme-
diaries may nd that engaging in lobbying activities is protable in order to a¤ect political
decisions in a favorable direction. In this case, however, one would need to explain why
banks lobby for regulation rather than taxation. Moreover, the idea that nancial policies
are specic-interest policies is questionable. We rather think that any policy intervention
in nancial markets is in principle a general-interest policy. Every citizen is a potential
portfolio owner. Thus anyone can perceive the private consequences of any policy measure
that may a¤ect, directly or indirectly, the relative cost of his alternative portfolios and the
relative benets from systemic risk reduction.
These are relevant aspects of policy making in relation to systemic nancial risk. They
are not alternative, but rather complementary to the points made in this paper and they
may eventually suggest extensions to our approach.
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